



no 1022 / marC   2009







Wage strUctUr  es
in the eUro areaWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1022 / MARCH 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge from
http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1337487.
In 2009 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€200 banknote.
UNDERSTANDING INTER-INDUSTRY 
WAGE STRUCTURES IN THE 
EURO AREA  1
by Véronique Genre  2, Karsten Kohn  3 
and Daphne Momferatou  2
1   This paper was written while Karsten Kohn was working at the European Central Bank. Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the 
European Central Bank, the European System of Central Banks, or the KfW Bankengruppe. We thank participants of the EAM seminar at the 
European Central Bank (November 2006) and of the WDN workshop in Frankfurt (February 2007) for fruitful discussions





3   KfW Bankengruppe Frankfurt, Palmengartenstraße 5-9, D - 60325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany and IZA Bonn; 
2   European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D - 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: veronique.genre@ecb.europa.eu;© European Central Bank, 2009
Address 
Kaiserstrasse 29 
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Postal address 
Postfach 16 03 19 
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s). 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 




Wage Dynamics Network 
 
This paper contains research conducted within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The WDN is a 
research network consisting of economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks (NCBs) of the EU countries. The WDN aims at studying in depth the features and sources of wage 
and labour cost dynamics and their implications for monetary policy. The specific objectives of the network 
are: i) identifying the sources and features of wage and labour cost dynamics that are most relevant for 
monetary policy and ii) clarifying the relationship between wages, labour costs and prices both at the firm 
and macro-economic level.  
 
The WDN is chaired by Frank Smets (ECB). Giuseppe Bertola (Università di Torino) and Julian Messina 
(Universitat de Girona) act as external consultants and Ana Lamo (ECB) as Secretary. 
 
The refereeing process of this paper has been co-ordinated by a team composed of Gabriel Fagan (ECB, 
chairperson), Philip Vermeulen (ECB), Giuseppe Bertola, Julian Messina, Jan Babecký (CNB), Hervé Le 
Bihan (Banque de France) and Thomas Mathä (Banque centrale du Luxembourg). 
 
The paper is released in order to make the results of WDN research generally available, in preliminary 
form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper 
are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the ESCB. 3
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1022
March 2009
Abstract  4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  6
2  Inter-industry wage differentials: 
theory and empirical evidence  7
2.1  The theoretical rationale for 
inter-industry wage differentials  7
2.2  Evidence from the empirical literature  10
3  Inter-industry wage differentials in the 
euro area: an in-depth investigation  12
3.1  Data and stylised facts for the euro area  12
3.2 Estimation  approach  15
3.3 Results  17
4 Conclusion  23
References  25
Appendices  29
European Central Bank Working Paper Series  44
CONTENTS4
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1022
March 2009
Abstract
This paper focuses on the euro area wage structure and its potential determinants from 
a sectoral viewpoint. Merging information from the OECD Structural Analysis 
database with data from the EU Labour Force Survey, we construct a cross-country 
panel of 22 industries in 8 euro area countries for 1991-2002. Data inspection confirms 
the existence of a fairly stable inter-industry wage structure that is similar across 
countries. We then apply panel data techniques to identify factors explaining inter-
industry wage differentials in the euro area. Both workforce characteristics (e.g.,
human capital variables) and firm-related characteristics (e.g., capital intensity, 
productivity) contribute significantly. However, considerable wage heterogeneity 
across sectors remains. Idiosyncratic sector and country specifics, reflecting different 
sociocultural and institutional backgrounds, appear to bear a major role. While our 
paper only uses direct evidence from workforce and firm-related characteristics, we 
also try to relate the remaining heterogeneity to institutional characteristics, based on 
available relevant literature. 
Keywords: euro area, inter-industry wage differentials, panel estimation, firm and 
workforce characteristics, labour market institutions. 
JELClassification: J31, J24, J51. 5
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Non-technical summary 
This paper focuses on the euro area wage structure and its potential determinants from a sectoral 
point of view. Merging information from the OECD Structural Analysis database with data from 
the EU Labour Force Survey, we construct a cross-country panel suitable to study inter-industry 
wage differentials in the euro area. The panel captures 22 industries (comprising agriculture, 
utilities, construction, and various branches of manufacturing and services) in eight euro area 
countries representing more than 90% of euro area GDP (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Austria, and Finland) for the period 1991-2002.  
Descriptive inspection of this data set confirms the existence of a stable inter-industry wage 
structure which is rather similar across euro area countries and which exhibited only fairly small 
changes over the 1990s. For example, average wages are traditionally low in agriculture, in 
textile industries, hotels and restaurants, or in social and personal services. Highest average 
wages are observed in utilities and financial intermediation. 
Drawing on the vast theoretical and empirical literature on potential determinants of inter-
industry wage differentials, we then apply panel data techniques in order to identify factors 
explaining the euro area industry wage structure between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Wage differentials are found to reflect the sectoral composition of the workforce and 
characteristics of the firms operating within the sectors. Still, idiosyncratic sector and country 
specifics reflecting different socio-cultural and institutional backgrounds, appear to bear a major 
role. While our paper only uses direct evidence from workforce and firm-related characteristics, 
we also try to relate the remaining heterogeneity to institutional characteristics based on 
available relevant literature, such as the extent of unionisation or the degree of centralisation and 
coordination of collective bargaining. In particular, characteristics of the workforce such as the 
importance of part-time work, the shares of young, older, and female workers, or the share of 
self-employment in a sector are relevant variables for explaining differences in average wages 
across sectors. Firm characteristics such as capital intensity and apparent labour productivity also 
have a significant impact. However, while our preferred model captures reasonably well the 
overall wage structure, it also reveals the non-negligible importance of idiosyncratic factors, 
which appear to bear a major role, especially for some industries such as agriculture or the health 
sector. These unobservable sector-specific factors may, on occasions, exert pressure on wages 
that counterbalances or even overcompensates for the influence of traditional observable 
determinants. 1. Introduction 
According to the Optimal Currency Area theory, a number of criteria need to be fulfilled in 
order to maximize economic efficiency among countries sharing the same currency. It is 
widely admitted that the euro area scores quite highly according to a number of these (e.g., 
economic openness, diversification in production and consumption, price stability and some 
aspects of financial integration), whilst it scores less well in other areas such as some facets of 
financial integration and, in particular, price and wage flexibility. In a single monetary union, 
flexible labour markets are needed to enhance the ability of individual countries to respond to 
specific circumstances and economic shocks. Wages in particular may need to adapt strongly 
and/or quickly and adjustments may need to closely reflect regional and/or sectoral 
productivity differences. 
Hence, understanding sectoral wage differentiation in the euro area is an important issue for 
policy makers. Yet existing literature from an inter-industry perspective is sparse. Genre, 
Momferatou and Mourre (2005) provide some descriptive evidence on the magnitude and the 
development of wage differentials in euro area countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Their 
key finding that there are substantial and persistent differences in relative wage levels between 
various sectors of the euro area economy — such as agriculture, utilities, construction and 
various branches of manufacturing and services — is a common finding in the empirical 
literature on inter-industry wage differentials since the early observations of Slichter (1950).  
A number of determining factors of inter-industry wage differentials — ranging from 
workforce characteristics to firm-, sector-, and work-environmental factors — have been 
identified in the literature. Our paper extends upon the existing literature by examining 
determinants of the inter-industry wage structure for the euro area economy. We merge 
information from different data sets at the two-digit industry level and apply panel data 
techniques in order to identify various factors that may explain inter-industry wage 
differentials in the euro area between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, using a panel of 22 
industries in eight euro area countries. This approach offers several advantages. On the one 
hand, euro area countries share some common structural features, such that a joint approach 
appears to be sensible. On the other hand, we can also account for potential heterogeneity 
across countries and/or sectors which may be due to different institutional structures, such as 
wage bargaining systems or degrees of job protection. 
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similar across euro area countries and which exhibited fairly small changes over the 1990s. 
Both workforce characteristics (e.g., human capital variables) and firm-related characteristics 
(e.g., capital intensity or apparent productivity) appear to significantly contribute to the 
observed wage differentials. However, even when controlling for both observed and 
unobserved effects, considerable wage heterogeneity across sectors remains. In other words, 
beyond traditional determinants of wage differentials, some idiosyncratic factors, especially in 
some sectors of the economy, must be at play in shaping the euro area wage structure. The 
importance of these idiosyncratic factors differs widely across sectors. We also find some, 
albeit more limited, differences across countries. We therefore also touch upon the country-
specific effects and trends, to have a more complete overview of the factors behind inter-
industry differentials in the euro area countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews theoretical rationales for inter-
industry wage differentials and summarises related empirical evidence. Section 3 presents our 
data and stylised facts for the euro area, as well as the methodology for and the results of our 
econometric analysis. Despite our focus on inter-industry wage dispersion, this section also 
includes a brief analysis of the country-specific factors influencing inter-industry wage 
differentials in the euro area. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Inter-industry  wage  differentials: theory and empirical 
evidence 
Although a textbook competitive labour market model would argue that wages should be the 
same for equivalent workers working in equivalent jobs, it has long been noted that there are 
substantial differences in wages across industries for workers with similar characteristics 
doing apparently similar jobs (Slichter, 1950). Empirically, substantial wage differentials have 
been found in many countries and they are surprisingly persistent over time. A number of 
theoretical arguments have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. 
7
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On the one hand, standard competitive theories argue that wage differentials reflect labour 
productivity differences among the workforce resulting from differences in individual human 
capital endowments (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Workers’ characteristics such as 
educational attainment, professional experience or age are thus crucial to explain individual 
wage levels. As employees working in the same industry may require similar skills, these 
differences may largely translate into industry differences.  
Alternatively, differences in wage levels might also compensate for non-pecuniary aspects of 
work that directly affect a worker's utility, such as available social benefits or an atypical 
work environment (see Purse, 2004). For example, strenuous jobs, particularly common in 
industry, may offer higher wages compared with office jobs which are more common in some 
service sectors. 
Another possible explanation put forward by the tenants of competitive theories is that wage 
differentials may just reflect a temporary disequilibrium in response to shifts in labour 
demand or supply wherever labour is imperfectly mobile, notably in the short run. In this 
case, inter-industry reallocations are hampered by frictions. Search and matching models (see 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) extend upon the concept of frictions. In case there are 
informational asymmetries and job search is costly, wages fall short of marginal productivity. 
In models with on-the-job search, firms can follow different equilibrium strategies: either they 
pay low wages invoking a high employee turnover or they pay higher wages resulting in 
lower turnover. Again, this may translate to the sectoral level as firms in the same industry 
can be expected to face similar frictions. 
In sum, competitive theories imply that in the long-run and beyond temporary frictions, 
sectoral wage differentials should largely reflect individual differences that translate into 
sector-specific differences. 
On the other hand, tenants of new wage determination theories, unlike those of competitive 
theories, focus on reasons why firms may find it more profitable to pay higher wages than those 
suggested by the equilibrium level resulting from market forces at play. These models rely on 
the major assumption that there is imperfect market competition — which may result from 
barriers to international trade, national regulation, monopolistic competition stemming from 
8
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firms are able to extract rents from their product markets and pay higher wages. Moreover, 
firms distribute parts of this rent to their employees in the form of a wage premium.  
Rent sharing may be motivated by a number of reasons. Much attention has been given to 
“efficiency wage” models that attempt to explain why firms may pay more than the 
reservation wage to basically select the most efficient workers (Yellen, 1984; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1986). Several different versions of the efficiency wage model have been proposed in 
the literature:
1  
•  According to “turnover models”, firms may wish to pay higher wages to reduce quits 
and turnover (see Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1974 and 1985). Higher wage rates make jobs 
more attractive and workers less likely to switch to other jobs. These models predict 
that high wage industries are those in which turnover costs are highest.  
•  In “shirking models” (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), firms engage in some monitoring of 
their employees and fire those workers caught shirking. Employees have an incentive 
to shirk if they can be re-employed in another firm at the going wage rate after having 
been fired by the current employer. By paying above market wages, firms decrease the 
incentive to shirk, as the risk of unemployment makes dismissals costly to the 
employee. According to these models, high wage industries are those with high 
monitoring costs and/or those which bear a relatively high cost of employee shirking.  
•  “Adverse selection models” (Stiglitz, 1976; Weiss, 1980; Greenwald, 1986) assume 
that the average quality of the pool of job applicants increases together with the wage 
rate. In these models, industries which are more sensitive to labour quality differences 
or have  higher costs of measuring labour quality will offer higher wages in order to 
raise the average quality of the workforce.  
•  Finally, so-called “fair wage models” (Akerlof, 1982 and 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990), suggest that employees will exert more effort if they think they are paid fairly. 
These models predict that high wage industries are those where teamwork and 
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industries with high profits should be those which pay higher wages. 
From a sectoral perspective, firms within the same industry are likely to face similar product 
market conditions and hence share similar characteristics that may influence the average wage 
level and differentiate it from the average wage level in different industries. For example, specific 
production technologies or the concentration of large firms which makes employees’ productivity 
more difficult to monitor, may contribute to increasing the average wage level in a specific 
industry. Other sectoral variables, such as the exposure to international competition, are also likely 
to influence the amount of product market rents and therefore the capability to pay higher wages. 
Finally, the actual outcome of rent sharing between employers and employees crucially 
depends on the relative bargaining power of the involved parties, as well as on institutional 
settings. The presence of strong and coordinated trade unions is likely to induce higher wages 
for the represented market segments (Naylor, 2003). Unions are traditionally strong in 
manufacturing industries and in public sector services, whereas they are less prevalent in 
private service industries. In “insider-outsider models” (see Lindbeck and Snower, 1988), 
firms may find it more profitable to pay more than competitive wages to insiders in order to 
avoid strikes or an increase in unionisation, and to maintain industrial peace. Moreover, 
insiders, who have gained firm-specific skills, are likely to be more productive than outsiders. 
This experience makes them less easy to replace and puts them in a good position to claim 
and obtain higher wages. These models based on bargaining power imply that the wage level 
will depend on a number of different factors: the nature of jobs (e.g., the proportion of skilled 
occupations in an industry), the size of firms (which affects employers’ ability to replace 
numerous wage claimers at the same time) and the firms’ ability to pay (i.e., market power). 
In addition, labour market institutions such as wage setting regimes or legal labour market 
requirements affect the speed of wage adjustments (see Blau and Kahn, 1999). Labour market 
institutions such as bargaining co-ordination and employment protection is generally thought 
to have a compressing effect on the wage structure (see Bertola et al. 2000; Haffner et al. 
2001; Devroye and Freeman 2002). Beyond firm or sector specific effects, different 
institutional frameworks should be visible at the country level.  
10
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Empirical evidence shows the existence of substantial and persistent inter-industry wage 
differentials in various countries. Starting with Slichter (1950), a large body of literature 
estimated wage differentials using individual-level data, which allow controlling for a number 
of individual and match-specific determinants of wage differences. In a seminal paper, Krueger 
and Summers (1988) concluded that considerable differences between US industries remained 
even after accounting for observed as well as unobserved individual heterogeneity. This finding 
fostered a dense line of empirical research, which largely confirmed that wage differentials 
across industries remain a significant and quite stable phenomenon over time and across 
countries (see Groshen, 1991). Katz and Summers (1989) introduced a two-step approach. In a 
first step, they used individual micro data to estimate inter-industry wage differentials net of 
observable individual characteristics. In a second step, they related these estimates to industry-
specific determinants such as average establishment size or composition of the workforce at the 
two-digit industry level. Their findings also confirm the existence of substantial wage 
differentials across sectors. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) used linked employer-
employee data and controlled for individual as well as firm heterogeneity (both observed and 
unobserved). Again, even though the addition of firm heterogeneity considerably reduces inter-
industry differentials, sizeable differences in wage levels across sectors remain. 
Industry-level analyses can benefit from internationally comparable data sets and thus provide 
the possibility of cross-country comparisons. There are a few studies which focus on cross-
country comparisons of inter-industry wage differentials.
2 Gittleman and Wolff (1993) collect 
evidence for some OECD countries for different years between 1970 and 1985. As a main 
result, they note that the rank order of industry differences remained fairly stable over time. 
They also undertake bivariate comparisons of wage differentials with possible determinants 
such as productivity growth, output growth, capital intensity, or export orientation. Albæk et al. 
(1996) analyse wage differentials in the Nordic countries. Using country-specific individual-
level data, they estimate unconditional as well as conditional inter-industry wage differentials 
and compare these across countries by means of correlation coefficients and variance 
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the dispersion between industries, and that although controlling for individual characteristics 
considerably reduces variability, it leaves the general pattern of differentials unchanged. Erdil 
and Yetkiner (2001) focus on differences in wage structures between industrialized and 
developing countries. Looking at rank correlations, they find rather small differences between 
the two groups of countries. Their attempt to regress wage differentials on possible determinants 
(international competitiveness, labour productivity, industry profitability, firm size, and the 
share of women in the work force) uses pooled data without controlling for worker 
characteristics or industry-specific effects. Jean and Nicoletti (2002) examine the impact of 
product market regulation on industry wage premia in European and North American countries. 
Following the two-step approach of Katz and Summers (1989) and using a cross-section of data 
from different OECD databases in 1996, they estimate positive impacts of different measures 
for product market regulation on industry-level wages.
3 However, the approach which controls 
for the impact of human capital variables already at the first stage does not allow the authors to 
investigate additional determinants of wage differences between sectors. 
As a first step towards investigating inter-industry wage structures for the euro area as a 
whole, Genre, Momferatou, and Mourre (2005) provide descriptive evidence on the 
magnitude and the development of wage differentials since the early 1980s and motivate 
possible determinants by means of bivariate correlation measures. Again, they find substantial 
differences in wage levels between various sectors, largely similar across euro area countries, 
the UK and the US. Moreover, the inter-industry structure in the euro area economy is found 
to be fairly stable throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with only a small increase in overall wage 
dispersion across industries during this period. 
                                                 
3   Jean and Nicoletti refer to the two-step approach put forward by Dickens and Katz (1987) and Katz and 
Summers (1989). However, as they employ industry-level data not only at the second, but also at the first 
stage, the set-up masks an analogous one-step representation. 
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depth investigation 
3.1  Data and stylised facts for the euro area 
Our study extends upon this empirical literature by analyzing inter-industry wage differentials 
for the euro area by means of panel data techniques. Using data from the Structural Analysis 
(STAN) database of the OECD and from the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS), it is 
possible to construct various indicators for a panel of 22 branches of economic activity 
(covering construction, utilities — i.e., electricity, gas and water supply — and several sub-
sectors of manufacturing and services) in eight euro area countries
4 between 1991 and 2003 (see 
appendix A). The STAN database provides data for compensation of employees and 
employment which enable us to calculate the average wage in sector i in country j at time t, wijt, 
as the ratio of total compensation to the number of employees. Wage differentials yijt are then 
defined as the relative deviation of sector i’s wage wijt from the overall country average wjt: 
  ) / ln( jt ijt ijt w w y ≡ . (1) 
Descriptive evidence confirms the existence of substantial and persistent differences in 
average wage levels in the various sectors of the euro area. Figure 1 shows the percentage 
deviation of the average level of compensation per employee in each sector from the average 
wage level for the euro area economy as a whole, in the period 1991-2002. Clearly, there is a 
great degree of wage dispersion across sectors, with strongly negative wage differentials 
(more than 50% in agriculture, but also quite significant ones in textile industries, hotels and 
restaurants, and in social and personal services) and strongly positive ones (up to nearly 50% 
in utilities and financial intermediation). 
                                                 
4   These are Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Austria and Finland, which represent 
more than 90% of euro area GDP. 
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March 2009Figure 2 summarises the information across countries, in form of a box plot diagram. Overall, 
the same pattern is visible, with sectors like agriculture, textile industries or social services 
exhibiting strongly negative wage differentials compared with the rest of the economy. At the 
other end of the spectrum, financial intermediation services and utilities are generally the 
sectors where wages are highest in all euro area countries. The level of variation differs across 
countries to some degree. For example, Portugal shows the most pronounced differentials, 
reflecting some striking outliers, as in the cases of large positive differentials in electricity, 
gas and water supply and in financial intermediation, and large negative differentials in basic 
metals and fabricated metal products. Finland on the other hand, appears in most cases very 
close to the average wage line, implying a much flatter wage structure across sectors. 
Moreover, there exists some degree of relative sectoral variation across countries despite the 
overall similar picture of wage dispersion.
5 For example, figure 2 shows a tendency for larger 
negative wage differentials in hotels and restaurants in some countries (e.g., Germany, The 
Netherlands) than in others (e.g., France). In general, it appears that there are somewhat larger 
differences across countries in service sectors than in manufacturing, where the wage 
structure tends to be more similar. This result may to some extent be explained by the greater 
exposure of manufacturing sectors to global forces and competition, compared with the 
relatively more insulated service sectors. In addition, the role of the public sector, which 
would be especially relevant for services, may also contribute to heterogeneity across 
countries.  
 
                                                 
5   See also figure 4 below in this section. 
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Deviations of industry wages from country averages.  
Data source: OECD STAN. 
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in figure 3. The average euro area wage structure remained remarkably stable over this period 
and the sectors which paid relatively well at the beginning of the 1990s continued to do so in 
2002. However, while the overall structure remained nearly unchanged, there has been some 
visible increase in the degree of dispersion over time.  
 









Figure 4 displays the evolution of weighted within-country standard deviation of wage 
differentials  
   ∑ =
− ≡
N
i ijt i jt y g N
1
2 1 σ , (2) 
where  gi denotes employment weights of sectors i (cp. table A.1 in the appendix A). 
Increasing dispersion across industries is common to most euro area countries with the 
notable exceptions of Spain, where wage differentials tended to narrow, and of Italy and 
Austria, where the overall wage dispersion did not change much between 1991 and 2002. The 
increase in average euro area wage dispersion during the 1990s thus is mainly driven by three 
of the largest euro area countries, namely Germany, France, and The Netherlands.  
By and large, the notable cross-country differences in within-country wage dispersion remain 
rather stable over time. Three different groups of countries emerge from an inspection of figure 4: 
On the one hand, Portugal and Spain exhibit the highest level of wage dispersion; on the other 
17
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March 2009hand, Finland exhibits the lowest; and finally the rest of the countries cluster around the middle, 
with Austria at a somewhat lower level by 2002. Such country level differences likely result from 
country-specific institutional factors beyond compositional differences in worker or firm 
characteristics. Some country-level studies highlight the existence of different features of wage 
bargaining systems which could give rise to different wage structures. For example, a recent study 
in the context of the Wage Dynamics Network (du Caju et al., 2008), investigates a wide range of 
such characteristics based on countries’ replies to an according questionnaire. The focus of our 
paper is to examine wage differentials at the sectoral level, using worker and firm characteristics. 
However, we also conduct an analysis of the cross-country heterogeneity and see to what extent 
country effects can be reconciled with existing literature on wage setting institutions. Ex ante, the 
country differences in figure 4 could be attributed to the impact of immigrant labour in Spain and 
Portugal and a segmented, rigid labour market keeping wages in certain industries relatively low, 
while preserving much higher ones in some services. In Finland on the other hand, the higher flow 
rates in the labor market as well as the redistributional aspects implied by the “flexicurity” regime 
could be behind the relatively low wage dispe r s i o n  w i t n e s s e d .  W e  discuss cross-country 
differences further when interpreting our regression results below. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of inter-industry wage dispersion within euro area countries 
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Data source: OECD STAN. 
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during the 1990s and early 2000s confirms the picture drawn in Genre, Momferatou and 
Mourre (2005) for the 1980s and 1990s. There are substantial differences in average wage 
levels across sectors of the euro area economy. The degree of inter-industry wage dispersion 
varies across countries, although the overall wage structure remains quite similar and sectors 
with particularly high average wages are generally the same in all countries. There is much 
less variation in the wage structure across time, although there has been some tendency for 
sectoral wage levels to grow apart in the euro area during the 1990s. 
In addition to data required to compute compensation per employee and wage differentials, 
the STAN database offers information which allows for the construction of a number of 
additional indicators such as export intensity and import penetration ratios, apparent labour 
productivity, or capital intensity. Moreover, we merge the STAN data with information form 
the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS) provided by Eurostat in order to increase the 
number of available indicators and refine the overall picture of wage differentials and possible 
determining forces. In particular, the LFS provides sectoral indicators for skills of the 
workforce, types of occupation, gender, and age. It also provides data on part-time work, 
extent of self-employment, average size of firms, or hours worked in sectors of the economy 
(see appendix A for details on these indicators).  
Our combined dataset thus provides a large number of variables that may be used in light of 
the different rationales for inter-industry wage differentials. Nonetheless, a direct mapping of 
these variables to relevant theories is not completely straightforward as several variables may 
be consistent with multiple theories. Our aim is to make use of the theoretical lines of 
argument to select possible determinants and try to explain as much of the inter-industry wage 
variation as possible. 
3.2 Estimation  approach 
In order to disentangle possible determinants of the euro area wage structure and to derive 
conditional inter-industry wage differentials, we take advantage of the panel nature of the 
data. Using data for sectors i=1,…,N in countries j=1,…,J at time (years) t=1,…,T, we 
consider the basic error components wage regression 
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where ln( / ) ijt jt wP  denotes log real wages; X is a vector of observed covariates and β  is a 
coefficient vector to be estimated. In addition to a constant, the set of covariates X includes 
workforce  ─ or employee ─ characteristics on the one hand and firm ─ or employer ─ 
characteristics on the other. More precisely, employee-related variables include information 
on age and skill structure of the workforce
6, on its composition in terms of occupations, on the 
share of employees working part-time
7, the share of female employees
8, the share of 
temporary employment
9, the degree of self-employment,
10 and on average hours worked per 
week. Employer-related characteristics include variables such as real capital intensity and 
apparent labour productivity
11, firm size
12 and the exposition to foreign trade measured by 
import penetration ratios and export orientation
13. 
The error term  ijt u  contains country-specific effects  j µ , industry-fixed effects  i µ , time 
effects  t µ , and an idiosyncratic term  ijt ε : 
  ijt t j i ijt u µµµε =+++. (4) 
The set of time effects  t µ  takes account of euro area-wide business cycle effects in a flexible 
way. The country and sector-specific effects,  j µ  and  i µ , capture general economic conditions 
or socio-cultural and institutional backgrounds — such as the extent of unionisation or the 
                                                 
6   See Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) for the traditional human capital argument. 
7   The extent of part-time work has been rising over the past decades (OECD, 2006), and hourly wages have 
been proven to be lower for part-timers compared with full-timers (OECD, 1999). 
8   The existence of gender wage gaps has been extensively documented in the literature (see Altonji and Blank, 
1999). 
9   Ceteris paribus, workers with temporary contracts receive lower wages than those with permanent contracts 
(Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 2002).  
10   See Hamilton (2000) for wage effects of self-employment.  
11   See Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) on productivity differences. Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfrey 
(1996) note that wage increases follow earlier movements in profits. 
12   See Brown and Medoff (1989) and Oi and Idson (1999) for employer-size wage effects. 
13  See Johnson and Stafford (1999) and IMF (2006) for the impact of international trade and globalization on 
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14 In appendix B we show 
that the full set of sector effects  i µ , which yields the conditional inter-industry structure net 
of all observed impacts, can be estimated by means of orthogonalised weighted industry 
dummies. The conditional inter-industry wage structure can then be compared with the 
unconditional, observed wage differentials  ijt y . 
Alternative specifications of (4) would include, for example, sector and country time trends: 
  ijt j i j i ijt ut t δδµµε =+++ +. (5) 
The country-by-sector dimensioning of the data provides a large cross-section, but there is 
only a limited number of periods available (at maximum 12 years). Moreover, as it turned out 
in the descriptive analysis above, there is rather little variation of the industry structure across 
time. Estimation thus relies on fixed-T asymptotics. 
Under standard assumptions, pooled OLS (POLS) estimation of (3) provides consistent 
results. However, as evidence on the persistence of wage differences suggests, some 
autocorrelation is likely to be present and thus needs to be accounted for. One option to do so 
is to compute robust standard errors (Newey and West, 1987). A more efficient alternative, 
however, is to run a panel GLS estimation that uses the autocorrelation structure for 
weighting. Finally, a third approach would be to add lagged log wages  11 ln( / ) ijt jt wP −−  to the 
regression, yielding the following dynamic panel
15 
  11 ln( / ) ln( / ) ijt jt ijt jt ijt ijt wP w P X u γβ −− =+ + . (6) 
In this case, consistency of POLS hinges on the prerequisite that  ijt ε  exhibits no first-order 
autocorrelation. 
A more complex specification of the error term allows for interaction of country and sector-
specific unobserved effects  ij µ : 
  ijt t ij ijt u µµε =++. (7) 
                                                 
14   See the synopses in Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), du Caju et al. (2008), Flanagan (1999), OECD (1997, 2004), 
and Rowthorn (1992). 
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basic specification would remove the time-invariant  ij µ . Country and sector effects in the 
differenced equation would then correspond to country and sector trends in specification (4). 
In case of the dynamic specification (6), results from FE or FD estimations would be biased 
(Nickell 1981). However, consistency can be achieved by using the generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimation following Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond 
(1991). In this case, the error of the differenced equation must not exhibit second order 
autocorrelation. 
3.3 Results 
Table 1 summarises our main results, based on panel GLS estimations of equation (3), 
including time, country, and industry-specific effects and allowing for first-order 
autocorrelation. Column 1 of Table 1 reports a specification that includes workforce 
characteristics only. The estimated determinants are in line with a priori expectations.
16 In 
particular, a high share of young or low-skilled employees in an industry ceteris paribus 
comes along with lower real wages, while industries with a high share of older employees pay 
higher wages. Moreover, significantly lower wages are paid in sectors with high shares of 
women and part-timers.  
                                                 
16   Note that the set of workforce characteristics does not include occupation variables since occupation and skill 
categories turn out to be highly correlated. The same reasoning applies to average hours worked, which is 
highly correlated with the part-time indicator. 
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Table 1: Preferred specifications: Panel GLS     
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 ln(W/P)  ln(W/P)  ln(W/P)  ln(W/P) 
SHAREYOUNG -0.130***    -0.025  -0.084** 
 (0.046)    (0.062)  (0.041) 
SHAREOLD 0.109*    0.049  0.117** 
 (0.065)    (0.087)  (0.059) 
SHARELOWSKILL -0.127***    -0.084  -0.095*** 
 (0.035)    (0.051)  (0.031) 
SHAREHIGHSKILL 0.029    -0.104  -0.032 
 (0.044)    (0.065)  (0.039) 
SHAREPARTTIME -0.368***    -0.117  -0.259*** 
 (0.050)    (0.073)  (0.044) 
SHARETEMP 0.033    0.015  -0.005 
 (0.041)    (0.056)  (0.037) 
SHAREFEMALE -0.159***    -0.039  -0.073** 
 (0.038)    (0.052)  (0.034) 
SHARESELF -0.012    -0.032***  -0.045*** 
 (0.010)    (0.009)  (0.009) 
LOGCAPINT   0.029***  0.048***  0.025*** 
   (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
LOGPROD   0.225***  0.220***  0.260*** 
   (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.013) 
SHARESIZE19   0.071  0.139*   
   (0.061)  (0.073)   
SHARESIZE49   0.037  0.116**   
   (0.049)  (0.059)   
SHARESIZE50+   0.063*  0.119***   
   (0.036)  (0.042)   
EXPINT   -0.033  -0.072**   
   (0.028)  (0.028)   
IMPPEN   0.060***  0.052**   
   (0.022)  (0.022)   
Observations 1613  769  656  1543 
RHO 0.86  0.79  0.73  0.86 
Estimation by panel GLS, allowing for first-order autocorrelation (RHO). 
All specifications additionally include country, sector, and year specific effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The specification in column 2 only focuses on firm characteristics. This substantially limits 
the number of available observations, since some of the variables are only available for 
manufacturing industries. Again, the results are broadly in line with a priori expectations. In 
particular, high apparent labour productivity brings about significantly higher wages. Since 
apparent productivity is defined as the ratio of real value added to the number of employees, it 
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per worker units) which can be distributed between workers and capital owners. 
Consequently, the estimated coefficient would be in line with a positive direct effect of labour 
productivity as well as with the argument of profit sharing. Capital intensity also enters 
positively and significantly into the specification. High capital intensity, reflecting, for 
example, the use of specialised machinery, increases workers’ productivity and thus leads to a 
higher average wage. Moreover, capital-intensive industries are likely to be characterised by a 
high degree of firm concentration and are thus most likely to extract product market rents.
17 
Again in line with the literature, larger firms, and in particular those with more than 50 
employees, pay higher wages than smaller ones. Finally, although export orientation turns out 
insignificant in this specification, the import penetration ratio of an industry shows a 
significant and positive coefficient — firms which are more internationally integrated are 
ceteris paribus more likely to extract gains from trade, which can then be distributed between 
employers and employees. 
Column 3 reports results for a specification that brings together all workforce and firm 
characteristics. Interestingly, the partial effects of most workforce characteristics become 
insignificant. This finding could be due to two effects. First, when making use of both 
workforce and firm characteristics, the sample covers manufacturing industries only and thus 
exhibits less variation in sector specifics, as compared to the full sample. Second, the extent 
of collinearity between workers’ and firms’ characteristics is likely to be larger in 
manufacturing than in the rest of the economy. For example, bigger firms in manufacturing 
may tend to systematically employ more high-skilled workers due to the use of complex 
machineries and equipment in their production technology.
18 
 
                                                 
17   The inclusion of labour productivity and capital intensity as regressors might generally result in an 
endogeneity problem. Consider a basic sectoral production technology where inputs capital and labour are 
substitutes. Then capital intensity in a sector depends the relative price of capital in that sector and therefore 
on labour costs, i.e., wages. Labour costs also determine the amount of labour used, which would in turn have 
repercussions on labour productivity. In addition, both wages and labour productivity could be correlated to 
omitted third variables in the empirical framework. Unfortunately it is not possible to account for the possible 
endogeneity as finding valid instruments generally proves intricate at this level of aggregation. Following the 
standard approach in empirical labour economics when estimating wage equations, the regression 
coefficients should thus be interpreted as descriptive rather than causal effects. 
18   We examine the contributions of the two issues in table 3 below. 
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characteristics and a slightly reduced set of firm characteristics, thus circumventing the 
problem of sample reduction. By and large, the joint inclusion of worker and employer 
characteristics confirms the coefficient estimates of specifications (1) and (2), suggesting that 
multicollinearity is a minor issue. Yet some worker characteristics reveal slightly smaller 
partial effects. For example, the coefficient of the share of female employees is lower by 9 
percentage points. This finding hints towards some selectivity bias in specification (1), in 
which the effect of the omitted firm characteristics is taken up by the workforce variables. In 
addition, a few additional variables are significant in the preferred specification. For example, 
the share of older workers has a significantly positive impact, which would be in line with 
human capital theory or seniority-based remuneration schemes. The share of self-employment 
in an industry now shows a significantly negative coefficient, confirming the empirical 
evidence that, on average, self-employed tend to earn less than other workers with similar 
characteristics. One possible explanation could be that, to the extent that self-employed 
workers are in direct competition with wage-earners, the presence of self-employed in a sector 
lowers the bargaining power of employees. Also, sectors with a high share of self-employed 
are typically labour-intensive. Ceteris paribus, this would contribute to a lower average wage.  
Sensitivity checks with respect to the specification of the error component and to the choice of 
the estimation strategy are undertaken in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 confirms the robustness of 
our preferred specification. It investigates the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients with 
respect to different specifications of the error term  ijt u  and different sample restrictions. Our 
preferred specifications reappear in columns 1 and 2 of table 2. The specification in column 3 
uses our preferred set of covariates (as in column 2) but restricts the sample to manufacturing 
industries (as in column 1)
19. Estimated coefficients are rather similar to those of the 
benchmarks. More specifically, they lie within the range spanned by the respective estimates 
in columns 1 and 2, but most of the worker characteristics are insignificant. This result 
suggests that in fact both the higher degree of similarity among the workforce and the larger 
extent of collinearity between worker and firm characteristics inclined by the restriction of the 
sample contribute to the deviation of the full specification from our preferred one.  
                                                 
19  Note that the numbers of observations in columns 1 and 3 are not exactly equal because of single missing 
values in the additional variables used in column 1. 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
 LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P) LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P)  Y  Y 
SHAREYOUNG -0.025  -0.084**  -0.031  -0.005  -0.047  0.047  -0.022 
 (0.062)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.066)  (0.040)  (0.052)  (0.037) 
SHAREOLD  0.049 0.117**  0.078  0.069 0.085 0.054  0.091* 
 (0.087)  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.091)  (0.057)  (0.067)  (0.051) 
SHARELOWSKILL -0.084  -0.095*** 0.014  -0.127**  -0.113***  -0.015 0.034* 
 (0.051)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.052)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.021) 
SHAREHIGHSKILL -0.104 -0.032  -0.082* -0.096  -0.014 0.063 0.106*** 
 (0.065)  (0.039)  (0.049)  (0.066)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.031) 
SHAREPARTTIME -0.117  -0.259*** -0.078  -0.130*  -0.277***  0.013  -0.160*** 
 (0.073)  (0.044)  (0.058)  (0.076)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.032) 
SHARETEMP 0.015  -0.005  -0.069  -0.067  -0.081**  -0.003  -0.004 
 (0.056)  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.057)  (0.035)  (0.041)  (0.029) 
SHAREFEMALE  -0.039 -0.073**  0.003  -0.031 -0.053 -0.049 -0.097*** 
 (0.052)  (0.034)  (0.039)  (0.053)  (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.030) 
SHARESELF  -0.032*** -0.045***  -0.026*** -0.040***  -0.053*** -0.015*  -0.021** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
LOGCAPINT 0.048***  0.025***  0.033***  0.051***  0.029***  0.017**  0.014*** 
 (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
LOGPROD 0.220***  0.260***  0.225***  0.234***  0.280***  0.134***  0.161*** 
 (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.011) 
SHARESIZE19  0.139*      0.158**  0.117**   
  (0.073)      (0.075)  (0.059)   
SHARESIZE49 0.116**      0.119**    -0.006  
  (0.059)      (0.060)  (0.048)   
SHARESIZE50+ 0.119***      0.138***  0.153***   
  (0.042)      (0.042)  (0.032)   
EXPINT  -0.072**    -0.069**   -0.044   
  (0.028)      (0.028)  (0.028)   
IMPPEN  0.052**      0.050**  0.058**   
  (0.022)      (0.021)  (0.023)   
COUNTRY  EFFECTS  yes  yes  yes       
SECTOR EFFECTS  yes  yes  yes      yes  yes 
YEAR  EFFECTS  yes  yes  yes       
COUNTRY TRENDS        yes  yes     
SECTOR TRENDS        yes  yes     
Observations  656  1543  906  656 1543 656  1541 
RHO 0.73  0.86  0.83  0.69  0.86  0.84  0.89 
Estimation by panel GLS, allowing for first-order autocorrelation (RHO).       
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
 
The specifications in columns 4 and 5 of table 2 include country and sector-specific time 
trends instead of the full sets of country, sector, and year effects. While allowing for 
differences in unobserved effects across countries and across sectors, this approach comes at 
the price of reduced flexibility regarding business cycle effects. The coefficient estimates 
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precisely. This finding supports the understanding that, for example, trends towards skill 
upgrading or increased female labour force participation show different patterns across 
countries and sectors of the economy.  
Finally, columns 6 and 7 present specifications that estimate wage differentials  ijt y  rather than 
log wage equations. Just as in the benchmark specifications, unobserved industry effects are 
accounted for, and again the results broadly match those of the benchmark.
20 However, it 
should be noted that the impact of human capital variables is estimated less reliably. 
Subtracting country-by-time averages presumably takes away too much variation and thus 
renders the estimation of coefficients more problematic. 
Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of our results according to different estimation techniques. 
Compared with the results of the GLS benchmark reported in column 1, POLS estimates in 
column 2 show the same sign, but in most cases are larger in absolute value. We consider 
these results less reliable because — even though being consistent — the estimation does not 
take advantage of the autocorrelation structure in the data. Column 3 reports POLS estimates 
using the lagged endogenous variable as a regressor. Again the (short run) ceteris paribus 
effects are of the same sign as the benchmark coefficients, but the large persistency parameter 
renders most of them insignificant. Moreover, as the persistency parameter does not provide 
additional information regarding the economic determinants of wage differences, the 
approach is judged inferior to the benchmark specification. 
                                                 
20   Only the coefficient of the share of low-skilled workers changes its sign, while losing in significance. The 
share of high-skilled workers becomes significant with a positive coefficient as expected. 
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Table 3: Sensitivity analyses II: Different estimation strategies 
 (GLS)  (POLS)  (POLS_Lag)  (FD)  (FE)  (GMM) 
 LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P)  LOG(W/P) LOG(W/P) LOG(W/P) 
SHAREYOUNG -0.084**  -0.390***  0.004  0.058**  0.029 0.018 
 (0.041)  (0.103)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.021) 
SHAREOLD 0.117**  0.342**  0.006  0.005  0.050  0.022 
 (0.059)  (0.158)  (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.026) 
SHARELOWSKILL -0.095*** -0.404***  -0.027**  0.040*  0.027  0.015 
 (0.031)  (0.059)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.018) 
SHAREHIGHSKILL -0.032  -0.057  0.002  0.007  0.028  -0.017 
 (0.039)  (0.079)  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.024) 
SHAREPARTTIME -0.259*** -0.311***  -0.020*  -0.034  -0.057  -0.036 
 (0.044)  (0.070)  (0.011)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.025) 
SHARETEMP -0.005  -0.031  0.005  -0.015  -0.013  0.024 
 (0.037)  (0.081)  (0.012)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.021) 
SHAREFEMALE -0.073**  -0.290***  -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.034)  (0.068)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.021) 
SHARESELF -0.045***  -0.094***  -0.006***  -0.017*  -0.010  -0.030*** 
 (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
LOGCAPINT 0.025***  0.045***  0.007***  0.023***  0.020***  0.021*** 
 (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
LOGPROD 0.260***  0.311***  0.010***  0.138***  0.138***  0.088*** 
 (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.003)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.010) 
LOGW/P(-1)     0.966***      0.655*** 
     (0.006)      (0.025) 
Observations 1543  1545  1523  1345  1372  1323 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
(GLS) Estimation by panel GLS, allowing for first-order autocorrelation.  
Additional controls: country, sector, and year effects. 
(POLS) Estimation by pooled OLS, standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.  
Additional controls: country, sector, and year effects. 
(POLS_Lag) Estimation by pooled OLS, standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity.  
Additional controls: country, sector, and year effects. Test for autocorrelation: p-value = 0.951. 
(FD) Estimation in first differences, standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity.  
Additional controls: country and sector effects. Test for autocorrelation: p-value = 0.403. 
(FE) Estimation with (sector X country) fixed effects, allowing for first-order autocorrelation.  
Additional controls: year effects. 
(GMM) Estimation by two-stage GMM, instrumentation a la Arellano/Bond (1991).  
Additional controls: year effects. Test for second-order autocorrelation: p-value 0.506.  
 
The last three columns of table 3 report specifications which allow for interactions of country 
and sector-specific unobserved effects as defined in equation (7). These fixed effects are 
removed by means of FD (column 4), FE (column 5), or GMM estimation following Arellano 
and Bond (1991, column 6), respectively. Again, the inclusion of year effects takes account of 
business cycle effects. The effects of worker characteristics turn out to be insignificant in all 
three specifications. This result comes as no surprise since the descriptive analysis above 
confirmed the small degree of variation in wages over time, or — put differently — the little 
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remove between-cell variation and thus rely merely on within-cell variation, are therefore 
mainly unreliable. 
The benchmark specification in column 4 of table 1 thus remains our preferred one. This 
specification is estimated using a full set of orthogonalised weighted industry dummies as 
explained in appendix B. The estimated inter-industry wage differentials, conditional on our 
benchmark specification (and henceforth conditional differentials), thus illustrate “pure” 
sector effects and are compared with the observed wage structure for the euro area in the year 
2002 in figure 5.  
 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 02 12 2
sector
observed pure sector effects
 
Observed: Deviations of industry wages from euro area average.  
Pure sector effects: Weighted orthogonalised industry effects based on specification (4) of table 1. 
 
Overall, our model achieves a noticeable reduction in the variability in the wage structure. 
Once the impact of all worker and firm characteristics has been taken into consideration, the 
remaining employment-weighted standard deviation in wage levels across sectors due to the 
“pure” sector effects is 0.183. This corresponds to about two thirds of the standard deviation 
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part of sectoral wage differentials remains after controlling for observable worker and firm 
characteristics. In line with the results provided by the literature, the general pattern of 
differentials across sectors remains the same. Interestingly, the model captures the euro area 
wage structure for some sectors better than for others. For example, the worker and firm 
variables included in the model explain a large part of the positive spike for the utilities sector 
(12) or of the negative spike for the textile industry (3) — in these sectors the estimated 
sector-specific effect is considerably smaller than the observed differential. For other sectors, 
we detect a higher impact of idiosyncratic industry specifics which remain uncaptured by any 
of our observed variables. This holds, for example, for the agricultural sector (1). In some 
cases the “pure” sector effect and the observed differential even have opposite signs. In these 
sectors the idiosyncratic industry specifics are overcompensated by other determinants of the 
wage structure. In case of the health and social work sector, for example, the “pure” sector 
effect is positive, but it only serves to mitigate the negative wage impacts stemming from the 
composition of the workforce, firms’ capital intensity, and apparent productivity  in that 
sector.  
After having looked at the sector effects, we now turn briefly to look at wage differentials due 
to country-specific factors, which are not captured by our structural covariates but attributed 
to country trends in the error term. In equation (8) we analyse the evolution of within-country 
dispersion,  jt σ  as defined in equation (2) above. Again using panel GLS, we regress  jt σ  on a 




jt i ijt i X Ng X
−
= = ∑ : 
   jt jt jt X u σ β =+ . (8) 
Results for our preferred set of covariates are reported in table 4. While column (1) displays a 
basic specification without country-specific or time-specific effects, both country and time 
effects are included in column (2). In column (3) the error term  jt u  includes country-specific 
time trends (including country-specific intercepts). The latter specification is our preferred 
one, as it reduces the strong autocorrelation in  jt u  to a minimum.  
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Table 4: Regression of within-country wage dispersion 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 SIGMA  SIGMA  SIGMA 
SHAREYOUNG -0.280**  0.077  -0.294*** 
 (0.136)  (0.087)  (0.108) 
SHAREOLD 0.319*  -0.036  -0.425*** 
 (0.170)  (0.130)  (0.149) 
SHARELOWSKILL 0.134**  0.375***  0.104 
 (0.053)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
SHAREHIGHSKILL -0.202***  0.026  -0.004 
 (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.071) 
SHAREPARTTIME  0.243*** -0.153 0.441*** 
 (0.043)  (0.099)  (0.116) 
SHARETEMP 0.207***  0.041  -0.031 
 (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.084) 
SHAREFEMALE  -0.059 -0.057 -0.096 
 (0.054)  (0.060)  (0.063) 
SHARESELF 0.100  0.200**  0.181*** 
 (0.068)  (0.083)  (0.070) 
LOGCAPINT  0.038 -0.072*** 0.018 
 (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.013) 
LOGLABPROD -0.096***  0.018  -0.061 
 (0.028)  (0.060)  (0.057) 
COUNTRY EFFECTS    yes  yes 
YEAR  EFFECTS   yes  
COUNTRY TRENDS      yes 
Observations  70 70 70 
RHO 0.72  0.20  0.01 
Estimation by panel GLS, allowing for first-order autocorrelation (RHO). 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Workforce characteristics – in particular the age structure and determinants like the share of 
part-timers or self-employed – significantly contribute to explaining within-country wage 
dispersion. What is more, figure 6 displays the estimated conditional country trends, which 
can reasonably be compared to the observed country trends in wage dispersion in figure 4.
21  
                                                 
21  Note that, while the relative positions of the countries (i.e., the differences in dispersion) as well as the 
developments over time can directly be compared between figures 4 and 6, the overall (regression baseline) 
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Country-specific time trends (including country base effects) based on specification (3) of table 4. 
 
As in figure 4, Spain and Portugal appear at the top, and their observed evolution of wage 
dispersion appears to be largely explained by country specificities. Both of these countries 
have experienced an unprecedented influx of immigrant labour throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s. As the largest proportion of this additional workforce works in low-wage 
industries, this effect contributes to the persistently high degree of (conditional) wage 
dispersion. Germany and France maintain an upward slope in figure 6, suggesting that for 
reasons not related to worker or firm characteristics, there has been a tendency for wage 
dispersion to increase. In case of Germany, this might be linked to the reduction in trade 
union power during this period and the introduction of opening clauses in collective wage 
bargaining agreements. In addition to these institutional aspects, structural change in the years 
following German unification likely also played a role.
22.  
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case of the Netherlands, our covariates are largely sufficient to capture the increase of wage 
dispersion observed in figure 4 – the remaining country trend in figure 6 turns out flat.
23 In 
Finland though, the country-specific impact on wage dispersion has steeply increased in the 
period 1991-2002. This could be due to the fact that Finland belongs to a group of small 
countries in which the average pay increases of competitor and trading countries are taken into 
consideration. The opening up of markets and increased international competition would then 
have increased inter-industry dispersion in wages through a downward push in traded sectors. 
In contrast to the stronger dominance of sector-level negotiations in the rest of the countries in 
our sample, Finland exhibits a high level of corporatism – wage increases are negotiated at a 
highly centralised level and thus closely reflect macroeconomic developments and account for 
distributional objectives. This is reflected in the level of wage dispersion in Finland, which 
still remained low. “Flexicurity regime”-types of labour market reforms adopted in Finland, 
coming along with higher than average shares of women, young and part-time workers in total 
employment,
24 in turn compensated partly for the upward country-specific trend.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper focuses on the euro area wage structure and its potential determinants from a 
sectoral point of view. Drawing on the vast theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of inter-industry wage differentials at the country level provides us with a 
number of possible variables likely to explain differences in wage levels across various 
branches of the euro area economy. Our analysis then extends upon previous studies by using 
a large cross-country data set for the euro area as a whole, combining the detailed STAN 
database provided by the OECD with data from the European Union Labour Force Survey, 
and by using panel data estimation techniques. 
Our results confirm the existence of large and persistent wage differentials across sectors of 
the euro area economy. The traditional determinants offered by the literature explain a 
                                                 
23  Kouwenberg and van Opstal (1999) show that industry wage differentials in the Netherlands are positively 
and significantly correlated to industry profits. Similar results are drawn for six European countries in 
Gannon et al. (2007).  
24   See du Caju et al. (2008). 
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dispersion during the 1990s. In particular, characteristics of the workforce such as the 
importance of part-time work, the shares of young, older, and female workers, or the share of 
self-employment in a sector are relevant variables for explaining differences in average wages 
across sectors. Firm characteristics such as capital intensity and apparent labour productivity 
in a sector also have significant impacts. However, while our preferred model captures 
reasonably well the overall wage structure, it also reveals the non-negligible importance of 
idiosyncratic factors, which appear to bear a major role, especially for some industries such as 
agriculture or the health sector. These unobservable sector-specific factors may, on occasions, 
exert pressure on wages that counterbalances and, at times, overcompensates for the influence 
of traditional observable determinants.  
As a first step towards understanding the determinants of the inter-industry wage structure in 
the euro area, our analysis opens several avenues for future research. For example, a 
comparison with the US, using a similar dataset, would put the extent of wage differentials in 
the euro area and its evolution into perspective. Another route to follow would be to explore 
sectoral differences using micro-level data, such as the linked employee-employer data 
provided by the European Structure of Earnings Survey. This could possibly yield additional 
insights on those sector-specific factors which are unobserved so far. Finally, while this paper 
specifically sought to capture and study inter-industry dispersion in the euro area as whole, 
differences across countries also emerged. As further steps in understanding inter-industry 
wage differentials and a follow-up to this paper, a more detailed investigation of this 
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March 2009Appendix A: Data 
We use data from different sources. The Structural Analysis database (STAN) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides annual data for 
OECD countries. It is primarily based on national accounts data and uses data from other 
sources such as industrial surveys or censuses to estimate missing details.
25 On principle, data 
are available for the period 1970–2003. Due to missing data, however, we restrict our sample 
to the years 1991–2002. The euro area aggregation used in this paper consists of the eight 
countries Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland, 
which together cover more than 90% of the euro area in terms of GDP. Insufficient data were 
available for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Luxemburg. Table A.1 displays our classification 
of 22 industries as well as respective weights based on employment shares in the euro area. 
Definitions of variables taken or calculated from STAN are as follows:  
•  Compensation of employees comprises wages and salaries of employees paid by producers 
as well as supplements such as contributions to social security, private pensions, health 
insurance, life insurance and similar schemes. 
•  The number of employees includes all persons in employment, disregarding self-employed 
and unpaid family workers. In case of missing values for the number of employees in 
single sectors and years, numbers were backcast based on growth rates of corresponding 
employment numbers which include self-employed. 
•  Export intensity and import penetration are calculated as the respective ratios of exports or 
imports to total output (available for manufacturing industries only). 
•  Apparent productivity is measured by real value added (base year 2000) per employee. 
•  Capital intensity is calculated as real gross fixed capital formation (base year 2000) per 
employee. 
                                                 
25   Data might have been assembled with a varying degree of accuracy for different countries and sectors of the 
economy. In particular, caution should be exercised when comparing results for European countries with 
those for the United States (whose data rely on a slightly different industrial classification). However, 
consistency checks against alternative data sets in Genre, Momferatou, and Mourre (2005) showed a high 
degree of concordance between different data sets. 
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March 2009Eurostat further supplied cell-level information from the European Union Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly
26 household survey administered by the national 
statistical institutes of European Union (EU) and Candidate Countries in accordance with 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines. The EU LFS micro data collection 
started in 1983, but as the survey has not been mandatory until the early 1990’s, data are 
mainly available from 1993 onwards only. However, several country-series start in later years 
only, as observations with inconsistencies between the LFS waves had to be excluded. The 
definition of variables taken from LFS statistics is as follows:  
•  The number of employees includes all persons in employment, disregarding self-employed 
and family workers. It is broken down by several dimensions, including three age groups 
(below 25 years, 25–54 years, and above 55 years); three skill classes in accordance with 
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED: low-skilled workers with 
at most a lower secondary degree, medium-skilled with an upper secondary degree, and 
high-skilled employees holding a tertiary degree); three occupation groups in accordance 
with the International Standard of Occupations, ISCO (management and professional 
workers ISCO 1-2, base category ISCO 3-8, elementary occupations ISCO 9); gender 
(share of female employees); the share of part-time employees; and the share of 
employees holding a temporary work contract. 
•  The extent of self-employment is captured by the ratio of self-employed to the number of 
employees. 
•  Establishment size reports the shares of employees in four size brackets (up to 10 
employees, 11–19, 20–49, and 50 or more employees). 
•  Hours worked are defined as the average number of hours usually worked per week. 
Finally, we calculate country-specific price deflators using harmonized indices of consumer 
prices (HICP, base year 2000) provided by Eurostat.  
                                                 
26   Data have traditionally been reported for one reference quarter per year. Between 1996 and 2005 the LFS has 
gone through a transition towards a continuous quarterly survey. We chose the second quarter as reference 
when multiple quarters were available. 
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No.





1  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  A-B  01-05  4.5 
 Mining  and  Quarrying  C  10-14   
 TOTAL  MANUFACTURING  D  15-37  19.0 
2       Food products, beverages and tobacco  DA  15-16  2.5 
3       Textiles,  textile  products,  leather  and 
footwear 
DB-DC 17-19  1.8 
4       Wood, products of wood and cork  DD  20  0.6 
5       Pulp,  paper,  paper  products,  printing  and 
publishing 
DE 21-22  1.4 
6       Chemicals,  rubber,  plastics  and  fuel 
products 
DF-DH 23-25  2.0 
7       Other non-metallic mineral products  DI  26  1.0 
8       Basic metals and fabricated metal products  DJ  27-28  2.7 
9       Machinery and equipment   DK-DL  29-33  4.1 
10       Transportation equipment   DM  34-35  1.8 
11       Manufacturing nec; recycling   DN  36-37  1.1 
12  Electricity, gas and water supply  E  40-41  0.7 
13 Construction    F  45  7.2 
 TOTAL  SERVICES  G-Q  50-99  68.8 
14       Wholesale and retail trade, repairs   G  50-52  15.4 
15       Hotels and restaurants  H  55  4.7 
16       Transport, storage and communication  I  60-64  5.6 
       Transport and storage   60-63  60-63   
       Post and telecommunications   64  64   
17       Financial intermediation   J  65-67  3.0 
18       Real estate, renting and business activities   K  70-74  11.7 
19       Public  administration  and  defence; 
compulsory social security 
L 75  7.6 
20       Education  M  80  6.2 
21       Health and social work  N  85  8.7 
22       Other  community,  social  and  personal 
service activities 
O 90-93  5.9 
       Private households  P  95-97   
       Extra-territorial organizations and bodies  Q  99   
 TOTAL  A-Q  01-99  100.0 
Note: Aggregates in bold. Italics: sectors not included due to too many missing values. 
(a) Classification used in the empirical analysis. 
(b) Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, revision 1. 
(c) International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic Activity, revision 3. 
(d) Industry share in percent of total employment in the euro area 2002, disregarding employment in sectors not 
included in the analysis.  
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The conditional inter-industry wage structure is obtained from a regression using weighted 
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We choose euro area employment numbers for the year 2002 (compare table A.1) as weights. 
The constraint (A.2) requires the coefficients on the industry dummies to denote deviations 
from an employment-weighted mean. It is implemented by redefining the industry dummies 
as follows. 
Choosing, without loss of generality sector 1 with  1 0 g >  as a reference industry, (A.2) can be 
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Defining the weighted orthogonalised industry dummies 
ijt ijt i ijt DS DS g DS =− % % , (A.5) 
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The effect for the reference industry 1 is obtained from equation (A.3). 
Estimation of (A.6) automatically yields an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix 
(1 ) (1 ) −× − %
kk V  of all k–1 coefficient estimates except for  1 δ . Again using (A.3), one obtains an 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix  × kk V  for the full set of k coefficients, including  1 δ : 















where  1 − k I  denotes a (k–1) identity matrix. Then,  
  VT V T ′ = % . (A.8) 
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